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Security policies define who may use what information in a computer system. Protection 
mechanisms are built into a system to enforce security policies. In most systems, however, 
it is quite unclear what policies a mechanism can or does enforce. This paper defines 
security policies and protection mechanisms precisely and bridges the gap between them 
with the concept of soundness: whether a protection mechanism enforces a policy. Differ- 
ent sound protection mechanisms for the same policy can then be compared. We also 
show that the “union” of mechanisms for the same program produces a more “complete” 
mechanism. Although a “maximal” mechanism exists, it cannot necessarily be constructed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Society differentiates kinds of information and endeavors to control their use. Out of 
concern for privacy of individuals and the cost of information theft, society has techniques 
for controlling who can obtain certain information, when they can obtain it, what uses 
they can put it to, and even who can produce it. We now symbolically represent sensitive 
information within computer systems. The control of information dissemination has 
proven to be as difficult to implement in computer systems as in the rest of societyl. 
It is currently the subject of study by many researchers: Bell et al., Denning, Fenton, 
Jones, Lampson, Neumann et al., Popek, Rotenberg, Schroeder, Walter et al., Weissman, 
Wulf et al. [l, 2, 5-7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15-171. 
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75-07251 and in part by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (F44620-73-C-0074) which is monitored by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research; 
R. J. Lipton was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Contract DCR 
74-24193 and in part by the Army Research Office under Contract DAHCXM-72-A-0001. Both 
authors were supported in part by the Rand Summer Institute on Security. 
i Benjamin Franklin once observed that, “Three may keep a secret, if two of them are dead.” 
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The need for precise and complete understanding of the basic questions in the security 
area is mandatory. To illustrate this, compare security enforcement flaws to compiler 
design flaws. When a compiler error occurs, the users complain and demand correction. 
On the other hand, when a security error occurs, the violator does not disclose the system 
flaw that allowed him to perform prohibited actions. Often in the case of information 
theft no trace remains to show that one user read information private to another. For 
these reasons precision and proofs are not a luxury but a necessity. 
While precision and proofs are required, in order to be credible the basic framework 
must be simple and clear. No one will believe an unstructured system is secure, just as 
no one will believe that a formal proof is correct if it is long, poorly structured, and based 
on imprecisely defined terms. We conclude that to be useful the basis of a theory in the 
security area must be simple. 
This paper develops basic notions relevant to security, providing a framework in 
which the underlying principles of security can be investigated. We believe it to be precise, 
yet simple. As we illustrate, a clear understanding of these basic notions makes evident 
the inadequacies of some of the proposed approaches to providing security. 
In Section 2 we present the basic elements of our theory: precise definitions of programs, 
of protection mechanisms, and of security policies. A security policy defines what informa- 
tion is to be protected; it has a nonprocedural form. For example, a security policy might 
state that a user is not to obtain “top secret” information. In contrast, a protection mecha- 
nism defines how information is to be protected; it has a procedural form. For example, 
a protection mechanism might check each operation performed by a user. The notion of 
soundness defines the bridge between the nonprocedural security policy and the procedural 
protection mechanism, i.e., a protection mechanism is sound for a security policy if it 
enforces the policy. 
Section 3 introduces a protection mechanism for a flowchart programming language, 
the surveillance protection mechanism, and illustrates how the flow of information that 
will occur at run time can be traced through the program. 
In Section 4 we compare protection mechanisms on the basis of how complete they 
are-i.e., which ones give the most outputs that are not security policy violation notices. 
We illustrate how the surveillance mechanism can be augmented to “recognize” higher 
level language constructs and sometimes to result in a more complete mechanism. 
Next we prove a theorem that it is hopeless to attempt to build a program that will produce 
the maximally sound protection mechanism, given a program and a security policy. 
Section 5 discusses static implementation of protection mechanisms. 
2. BASIC MODEL 
Security enforcement involves restrictions on the behavior of computer programs. 
These restrictions involve determining whether or not the output of a program encodes 
the information from only a restricted set of sources. This determination clearly depends 
only on the functional behavior of the program. This observation leads to our view of 
programs simply as functions from some set of inputs to some set of outputs. 
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DEFINITION. Define Q to be a program provided 
Q: D, x “. x D,+E 
where Q is a total function and Di is the range of the ith input and E is the range of the 
output. 
As demonstrated by Parnas [lo] and extended by Neumann et al. [9], programs can 
have two distinct types of uses. They can be used as “Y functions”, i.e., they can be used 
to “view” their “inputs”. On the other hand, they can be used as “0 operators”, i.e., 
they can be used to “operate” on their inputs. (Here input corresponds to the current 
state of the system.) Consequently, there are two types of security questions. Suppose 
that Q is a program, i.e. 
Q: D, x ... x Dk+ E. 
If Q is used as a view function, then the security question is: 
Does the value of Q(d, ,..., &) contain any information that it should not? This is 
the so-called “confinement” or “memoryless subsystem” question studied by Lampson 
[7], Schroeder [14], and Fenton [5]. On the other hand, if Q is used as an operator function, 
then the security question is: 
Does the value of Q(dr ,..., &) contain all the information that it should ? This second 
question has sometimes been called “data security” (Popek [ll]). It concerns itself with 
whether or not information, such as a system table, has been illegally altered and hence 
lost. 
In the rest of this paper we will study the first security question, i.e., the case where Q is 
used as a view function. We do, however, assert without proof that the same methods 
used here to study this case can also be used to study the second case. Let us now introduce 
some examples that we will refer to in the sequel. 
EXAMPLE 1. Fenton [5] studies programs Q of the form 
Q:D, x .‘. x Dk-+E 
where Di and E are the set of natural numbers. The value Q(d, ,..., &) is the value obtained 
by the computation of some given Minsky-machine that was started with its ith register 
containing di . Each register has a security attribute of either null or p&v, the latter 
indicating that the register possibly contains privileged information. Fenton studies 
whether or not Q(dI ,..., dk) contains priw information. We will return again to this 
example. 
EXAMPLE 2. Consider a program Q of the form 
Q:D, x ... x D, xF, x a.- xF,+E. 
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Here Di is the set of possible values for the ith “directory”; Fi is the set of values for the 
ith “file.” The value of Q(4 ,..., C& , jr ,..., fk) . 1s t h e result of some file manipulation 
program. In this example the ith directory will contain information about who can access 
the ith file. We wish, therefore, to know whether or not Q(dl ,..., dk , jr ,..., fk) contains 
any information from a file that was to be denied to us. We will also return to this example. 
One assumption we must make is that the value of a view function Q encodes all 
information that is available about the inputs. One example of program output, that is 
sometimes overlooked, is execution time-an implicit output that is often observable via 
interactive programs. The running time of a program can be a vehicle for communicating 
information. We raise this restriction to the status of a postulate: 
The Observability Postulate. The output value Q(dl ,..., d,), must be assumed to 
encode all information available about the input value (dl ,..., dk). Intuitively this statement 
appears sensible, yet almost too simple and obvious to mention. But it requires careful 
attention for two reasons. First, it is extra-mathematical in that no proof that it holds can 
ever be given. Second, there is a series of examples where it has not held in practice 
(Lampson [7]). 
EXAMPLE 1 CONTINUED. As Fenton correctly points out, the observability postulate 
does not hold for his programs. Indeed, both Denning [2] and Fenton leave open how 
to handle time. One of the contributions of this paper is the understanding of how to 
handle execution time in a clear manner. This is elaborated later on. 
We now turn our attention to the study of protection mechanisms. A protection mecha- 
nism acts as a“gatekeeper” :It suppresses or alters the output of the program it is protecting 
to avoid illegal transmission of information. In an operating system the protection mecha- 
nism is usually interleaved with the execution of the program being protected. This is 
not, however, necessary. One can define a static protection mechanism that is implemented 
at compile time. Therefore, our definition of protection mechanism must be able to 
accommodate a wide variety of possible types of mechanisms. 
DEFINITION. Suppose that Q: D, x ... x D, --f E is a program. Then M: D, x ... x 
D, + E v F is a protection mechanism for Q provided for all (dl ,..., dk) in Dl x ... x Dk 
either 
(1) M(4 ,..., 4) = Q(4 ,.-, 4) or 
(2) MC4 ,...> dk) is in the set F. 
The set F consists of the vioZation notices of M. 
A protection mechanism acts as follows: Suppose that (4 ,..., dk) is some possible 
input. Then the protection mechanism can either give Q(dl ,..., d,) to the user or return 
a violation notice. The user is to interpret the violation notice as: “It looks as if you 
(the user) have attempted to view information that is to be denied to you; hence, I 
(the protection mechanism) am giving you this message.” 
EXAMPLE 3. Suppose that Q: Dl x *.a x D, -+ E is a program. Then there are 
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two trivial protection mechanisms for Q. The first is the programQ itself. This corresponds 
of course, to no protection at all. The second is the program 
M: D, x ... x D,+Eu{A) 
where fl is not in E and M(d, ,..., dk) is always equal to /1. This corresponds to “pulling 
the plug.” 
EXAMPLE 1 CONTINUED. In Fenton’s model there are two interesting points about 
his notion of protection mechanism. First, Fenton does not make clear the distinction 
between the program Q and the mechanism M. This lack of distinction means, for 
example, that he cannot compare different protection mechanisms for the same program. 
Second, Fenton allows an unusual type of violation notice. In his case the violation notices 
(the set F) and the possible output of the original program Q (the set E) need not be 
disjoint. The set F includes the results of partial computations of the program Q. Thus 
it may be difficult for a user to determine whether or not he is getting the result of the 
expected computation; Q(dl ,..., dk) is, after all, both the output and a violation notice. 
Practically speaking, this difficulty may make it particularly hard to find program bugs 
that cause violation notices. 
EXAMPLE 2 CONTINUED. A violation notice in our simple file system might be a 
message of the form “Illegal access attempted, run aborted.” 
The purpose of a protection mechanism is to control information; in our framework 
this leads to the notions of security policy and soundness. 
DEFINITION. A security policy I for the program Q: D, x ... x D,< + E is a function 
from D, x ... x D, to !IJ where %J is a new set. 
A security policy acts as an “information filter.” The value of I(4 ,..., dk) has presum- 
ably filtered out all the information that was to be denied to the user. Let us now examine 
some security policies. 
1. Suppose that I(d, ,..., dk) is always 0. Then this security policy is “Allow the user 
no information.” 
2. Suppose that I(dl ,..., dk) is always (4 ,..., dk). Then this security policy is “Allow 
the user any information he wants.” 
3. Suppose that I(dl ,..., dk) = (dl ,..., di , 0 ,..., 0). Then this security policy is 
“Allow the user information only from D, x ... x Di .” Note that I filters out all 
information from D,+1 x ... x D, . 
Each of these example security policies is characterized by either allowing information 
or allowing no information about some input. This type of security policy is the type 
that is studied in detail here. These policies are the ones most commonly supplied in 
real systems. For example, after a user logs on to a system, the files in the system can 
be divided into two classes: those he should be able to access and those he should not. 
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(This partition of files may change with time, but at any instant such a partition exists.) 
Because of the importance of these policies we introduce a shorthand for them: 
DEFINITION. Suppose that Q: D, x ... x Dk-+ E is a program. Let allow(i, ,..., iVn) 
denote the security policy I: D, x ... x D, + Dil x ... x Dim where 
I(d, ,...) d/J = (dil ,..., di”,). 
Thus the security policy in (1) is aZZow( ). Th e security policy in (2) is aZZow(l,..., K). 
The policy in (3) is aZZow(l,..., i). 
EXAMPLE 1 CONTINUED. Fenton’s security attributes of priv and null are a basis for 
enforcement of security policies of the form aZZow(...). Objects may only encode informa- 
tion from sources having the null attribute. 
Though we will generally restrict discussion in the remainder of this article to policies 
of the aZZow(...) form, the reader should note that our definition of security policy does 
admit arbitrarily complex policies. For example, we include policies that filter input 
based on specific input values-content dependent policies. We also include policies 
(such as might be found in a data base system) where what a user is permitted to view 
is dependent upon a history of the user’s previous queries to the data base system. 
The key relation between a protection mechanism and a security policy is whether the 
mechanism enforces the policy. This relation is called “soundness.” 
DEFINITION. Suppose that I: D, x ... x DTc + 9 is a security policy and M: 
D, x ... x D, -+ E u F is a protection mechanism for the program Q. Then M is sound 
provided there is a function M’ : g + E U F such that for all (4 ,..., &J 
M(4 ,..., dk) = M’(l(d, ,..., dk)). 
A mechanism M is sound provided it behaves as if it received as input not (4 ,..., d,) but 
rather I(4 ,..., dk). 
We will now present a series of examples. These examples should help in understanding 
the basic notions of security policy and soundness. 
EXAMPLE 3 CONTINUED. Certainly the protection mechanism that always outputs (I is 
sound for any security policy. A program as its own protection mechanism may or may 
not be sound. 
EXAMPLE 2 CONTINUED. An interesting file system security policy is 
44 ,..., 4 , fi ,...> .fA = (4 >..., 4 , .f;,...,fL) 
where fi is fi if di = “YES” and is 0 otherwise. This security policy allows the user 
information about the ith file only in the case that the ith directory permits it. Note that 
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the user can always obtain the value of all the directories. Note also that this security 
policy is not of the form alZow(...). 
EXAMPLE 4. Denning [2] and Rotenberg [12] both present examples of protection 
mechanisms that leak information via their violation notices. This should not be considered 
surprising; their examples simply demonstrate unsound protection mechanisms. If M is 
sound, i.e., M(d, ,..., dk) = M’(l(d, ,..., dk)), then any decision made by M to output a 
violation notice can depend only on allowed information. 
EXAMPLE 5. Suppose that we next consider the following “logon” program: 
Q: D, x D, x D, + {true, false] 
where D, is the set of userids and D, is the set of possible tables that consist of pairs of 
the form 
(userid, password) 
and D, is the set of passwords. The value Q(dl , d, , d3) is true if and only if (4 , dJ is 
in d2 , i.e., only in the case that the password corresponds correctly to the given userid. 
Now consider the security policy aZZow( 1, 3), i.e., do not let the user have any information 
from the password table. Then Q, as its own protection mechanism (see Example 3), 
is unsound. The reason this program is workable in practice is that the amount of in- 
formation obtained by the user is “small.” 
EXAMPLE 6. The security policies studied here are “information control” policies. 
They must be distinguished from “access control” policies. For example, enforcing an 
access control policy that specifies that the operation READFILE cannot be performed 
is not the same as ensuring that information about A is not extracted. The operating 
system may have a sequence of operations excluding READFILE that has the same 
effect as READFILE( 
EXAMPLE 1 CONTINUED. Fenton’s protection mechanism is not completely defined. 
Indeed, one reasonable interpretation of it is unsound. The difficulty is the halt statement 
which is defined in terms of the program counter register P: 
if P = null then halt. 
What happens if P # null-that is, if the security attribute of the program counter is 
priv ? One possibility is to assume the halt statement to be a no-op and to proceed to the 
next statement; however, the semantics of the halt statement are undefined in case the 
halt statement is the last program statement. Another possibility is that in this case an 
error message (i.e., a violation notice) is output. This is, however, unsound because a 
program can be written that will output an error message if and only if x = 0. If the 
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security policy wishes to deny information about x, then this is unsound. In particular 
the absence of an error message would indicate that x # 0. Intuitively, the difficulty 
here is what we call “negative inference.” A classic negative inference is due to Doyle [4] : 
Inspector: Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention ? 
Holmes: To the curious incident of the dog in the nighttime. 
Inspector: The dog did nothing in the nighttime. 
Holmes: That was the curious incident. 
We next relate the observability postulate and the concept of soundness. Consider 
the following program Q: 
We consider x as the input and y as the output; hence, for any x, Q(X) = 1. For the 
security policy aZZow( ), i.e., allow no information about x, one could reason that the 
program Q as its own protection mechanism is sound since Q is a constant function. 
We can, however, simply observe the running time of Q to determine whether or not 
x = 0. This difficulty stems not from the definition of soundness but rather from a viola- 
tion of the observability postulate: the running time of Q was an implicit output. 
We formulate this example within our framework as follows: Let a program’s output 
be not just its computed output value but also its running time, which records the 
elapsed real time, the elapsed compute time, or the number of steps executed. Now the 
observability postulate is valid for Q. In particular Q(X) = (1, T), where T is the number 
of steps executed. This program as its own protection mechanism is not sound for the 
policy aZZow( ). 
One further example should reinforce the subtlety and importance of the relation 
between soundness and the observability postulate. Let programs have inputs that are 
placed on a linear one-way read-only tape with the head initially at the leftmost character: 
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where each xi is a block of characters. Consider a security policy aZZow(2), i.e., allow 
information only about the second block. Then we claim that no program Q can read zs 
and also be sound, provided running time is observable. This follows since, in order for Q 
to the part of the tape where za is stored, it must move across z, . Even if Q does not 
“look” at z1 , it will encode the length of zr into the computation of Q; hence, Q will not be 
sound. How can we avoid this problem ? One answer is to add a new operation, say 
tab(i). This operation in one step causes the read head to jump directly to the ith block. 
Now Q can read zs and be sound. But a new problem arises: Is the observability postulate 
valid? Perhaps tab(i) takes time dependent on the length of xi ,..., ziel ? The problem 
again arises; one solution is to program tab(i) so that it runs in constant time. 
While soundness is the most important bridge between protection mechanisms and 
security policies, the central issue is not just to construct sound protection mechanisms. 
The protection mechanism that always outputs some fixed violation notice is certainly 
sound-recall Example 3. It is also useless. (It is equivalent to pulling the computer’s 
plug out of the wall.) We are therefore led to consider the concept of how “complete” 
a protection mechanism is, i.e., which of a set of protection mechanisms will give more 
useful outputs (non-violation notices). 
We will compare two protection mechanisms for a program Q by comparing their 
outputs. As a basis for doing so, we do not distinguish between different violation notices. 
DEFINITION. Suppose that MI and M, are protection mechanisms for the same program 
Q and policy I. MI and Ma output the same single violation notice value. Then MI is 
as complete as M, (MI > M2) provided, for all inputs a (a stands for (ur ,..., a,)), if 
M,(a) = Q(a) th en MI(a) = Q(a). Also, MI is more complete than M, (MI > MJ 
provided MI > M2 and, for some a, MI(a) = Q(a) and M,(a) # Q(a). 
The relation > is a partial ordering on the protection mechanisms for a given program 
and policy. Also, > is a practically motivated ordering: Consider a single output program 
with two protection mechanisms MI and M, . MI > M, implies that MI never gives a 
violation notice when M, does not. This implies that the utility of MI is at least as high 
as that of M2, for practically one is interested only in computations that do not result 
in a violation notice. 
We can show how to “join” two sound protection mechanisms to form a new sound one 
that is as complete as each of the other two. 
DEFINITION. Suppose that M, and M, are protection mechanisms for the program 
Q. Define MI V M2 to be the protection mechanism M defined by 
V input a, M(a) = Q(a) provided 3i, M,(a) = Q(a), i E (1, 2}, 
= MAa) otherwise. 
The key property of union is that if either MI(a) or M,(a) has the same output as Q(a) 
then so has the union, MI V M,(a). Note that M2 V M,(a) gives violation notices for 
precisely the same inputs. Realistic mechanisms may differ in violation notice values. 
THEOREM 1. Suppose that MI and M, are sound protection mechanisms for program Q 
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and security policy I. Then M1 V Mz is a sound protection mechanism for Q and I. Moreover, 
M,VM,>M,andM,VM,>Mz. 
Proof. Immediate from the definitions. 1 
We can easily generalize Theorem 1 to show that from the sound protection mechanisms 
4 , M, ,.a. we can define one all-encompassing sound protection mechanisms M = 
M,VM,V... such that M > Mi . Indeed, if we assume only a single violation notice, 
it can easily be shown that the sound protection mechanisms form a lattice; we shall not, 
however, need this observation in the sequel. 
THEOREM 2. For any program Q and security policy I there exists a sound protection 
mechanism Mfor Q and I such that M is maximal. That is, for all soundprotection mechanisms 
M’ for Q and I, M > M’ where all violation notices are assumed equivalent. 
Proof. Let %X = {M’ 1 M’ sound for Q and I>. Let M then be VnrG~ N. Then as 
in Theorem 1, M > N for any sound protection mechanism 1M; hence, M is maximal. 1 
(Note that M, while well defined as a function, may not be recursive-even if Q is.) 
We have established that the maximal protection mechanism exists, but as we shall 
show later, it cannot always be constructed. 
We have now completed the development of our security model. The value of any 
model is in its useful application. We find that having the model’s precise definitions, 
which are independent of any particular model of computation or any mechanics of 
protection mechanism implementation, aids in understanding and appraising work in 
the security area. For example, we have already noted that if all pertinent observables 
cannot be specified then the “forgotten” observables provide a means for leaking infor- 
mation. Such is the case for a general-purpose operating system in which information 
can be passed via resource usage patterns. In one-now classic-case, user passwords 
consist of a small number of characters, say exactly K characters. Each password character 
is chosen from a set of n different characters. As we have already noted a password 
system is not a protection mechanism because it, of necessity, gives out information 
about user and password pairs. Security relies on the work factor of nk attempts to 
determine a user’s password. However, the work factor can be reduced to n . K by ap- 
propriately placing candidate passwords across page boundaries and observing page 
movement resulting from “guessing” password values. 
In summary, we should point out that we have informally used words like “information 
flow” and “dependence.” What these terms mean is precisely captured within our model. 
Though our security model can be easily understood informally, it is mandatory that it 
be precisely defined as well. Without a precise basis on which to build, one will never be 
able to make progress in convincing others of the security properties of a system. 
3. SURVEILLANCE PROTECTION MECHANISM 
This section both illustrates a new protection mechanism and develops the framework 
put forth in the preceding section. In order to define this mechanism we will restrict our 
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programs to be flowcharts with a single output and policies to be of the form aZZow(...). 
We will then show how to assign to each flowchart and security policy a protection me- 
chanism called the surveillance protection mechanism. This mechanism and a modified 
version that considers running time are then proved to be sound. 
DEFINITION. A flowchart F is a finite connected directed graph whose nodes are 
boxes of the forms: 
(1) Start box: 
(2) Decision box: 
(3) Assignment box: 
(4) Halt box: 
The predicate B(w) and the expression E(U) may involve input variables X, ,..., xk and 
program variables rl ,..., Y, and output variable y. Program and output variables may be 
used for intermediate computation values. We ascribe to the flowchart F the usual 
semantics: The domain of the variables (input, program, and output) is the integers. 
There is exactly one start box; execution begins there by initializing all the program 
variables and the output variables to 0. Since we view the flowchart F as computing a 
program Q with domain H x ... x Z (H = integers), we assume that each input variable 
is initialized to the value that corresponds to the current input. Thus if (ur ,..., UJ is the 
input value, then xi is initialized to ai . Execution then follows the logic of the flowchart; 
at a decision box, the path that corresponds to the predicate’s truth value is taken. Please 
note that no specific assumptions are made about what predicates or expressions are 
allowed: Any reasonable choice is allowed (i.e., so long as predicates and expressions are 
recursive there is no difficulty). 
The observability postulate makes it necessary to state exactly what the range of Q 
(the program computed by F) is. Here we will assert that we will study these flowcharts 
under two distinct assumptions. First, we will study the case where the range of Q is 
Z x Z. That is, the value of Q(a) has two components. The first is the value of y when 
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the flowchart halts; the second is the number of steps executed by the flowchart, i.e., the 
“time” used by the flowchart in computing the value of y. Therefore, we will be encoding 
the running time of our flowcharts. (Note that we might have chosen any of a number of 
attributes other than running time, but we feel that it is representative.) Second, we will 
also study the case where the range of Q is just Z. In this case the value of Q(a) has only 
one component: the value of y when the flowchart execution halts. For the second case 
we assume that running time is not observable by a user. 
We next describe the surveillance protection mechanism. It is based on the idea of 
keeping track of what inputs a variable may “depend on”. Essentially we will associate 
with each variable in the program a new variable c. The value of ; will be the set of 
indices of all input variables that may have effected the current value of ZJ in some way. 
A key point here is that we must keep track of v not only for input, program, and output 
variables but also for the program counter of the program. The need to do this for the 
program counter is independently illustrated in Fenton [5]. Therefore, let the program 
counter of Q be denoted by C. 
DEFINITION. Suppose that Q is a flowchart program. i Associate with each variable 
ZI of Q (input xi ,..., xlc ; program rr ,..., Y, ; output y; program counter C) a new variable T 
called the surveillance variable of v. The values of: are always subsets of {I,..., K}. 
We will now construct the surveillance protection mechanism for the case where time 
is not part of the output (i.e., when the range of Q is just 12). Then the surveillance protec- 
tion mechanism M corresponding to the program Q and some security policy I = &w(J) 
is constructed as follows. 
The variables of Mare the variables of Q plus the surveillance variables. M is obtained 
from Q by applying the following transformations: 
(1) Insert directly after the START box the assignments that set c to {i} if v is 
the input xi and set z to D otherwise. (ia is the empty set.) 
(2) Replace each assignment box in Q 
with the two assignment boxes 
Y - Elw,, ,wJ i’ y + )-WI ” ” wp ” s 
1 We will now identify programs with flowcharts. 
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(3) Replace each decision box in Q 
with the assignment box and decision box 
(4) Finally, replace each HALT box with 
Here fl is a symbol that is not a normal output of Q; it is used as a violation notice. 
Recall that I = aZZow(J). Clearly, given a program Q and a security policy I, M is indeed 
a protection mechanism. Indeed, M is always sound: 
THEOREM 3. If M is the surveillance protection mechanism for the program Q and the 
security policy I, then M is sound for Q and I provided running times are not observable. 
In contrast, it is easy to see that M is unsound when running time is observable. We 
will now show how our surveillance protection mechanism can be modified to handle 
running time and still remain sound. 
DEFINITION. Suppose that Q is a program and I is a security policy. Then construct 
the surveillance protection mechanism M’ for the case where running time is observable 
as follows: Transform Q into M’ by replacing each decision box of Q 
571/17/I-4 
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with the structure 
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and performing the other transformations as before. Intuitively, if a disallowed variable 
is about to be tested, flowchart execution is halted and a violation notice is given- 
immediately. It is easy to see that M’ is a protection mechanism. 
Note that when the running time is observable, the expressions and predicates allowed 
in a flowchart cannot be arbitrary, but must be restricted to those that can be implemented 
in time independent of disallowed data values. Note also that a protection mechanism 
may have a running time that differs from that of the original program. This is acceptable 
because users will run only the protection mechanism; the protection mechanism running 
time must not encode information about disallowed outputs. 
THEOREM 3’. If M’ is the surveillance protection mechanism for the program Q and the 
security policy I, then M’ is sound for Q and I even if running times are observable. 
We will now compare these two mechanisms. Suppose that MS is the surveillance 
protection mechanism for some program Q and security policy I and M,, is the high-water 
protection mechanism for Q and I. It is easy to see that MS > M, , i.e., MS is at least as 
complete as Mh . The following simple flowchart and the policy allow(2) shows that 
MS > Mh is possible: 
In this case Mh always outputs A; on the other hand, M, outputs A only when x2 # 0. 
Intuitively, surveillance is better here, since it allows “forgetting” while high-water 
mark does not. 
While surveillance is more complete than high-water mark, it is not maximal, i.e., it is 
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not the mechanism that produces the fewest violation notices. In order to see this, 
consider the following program Q: 
Let I = aZZow(2) be the security policy. Then the surveillance protection mechanism 44, 
for Q and 1 always outputs A. The reason that the surveillance protection mechanism 
performs poorly on Q is that, once the branch on x1 is taken, the surveillance mechanism 
is unable to detect that the assignment of y is independent of x1 . Consider, however, the 
protection mechanism Mmax = Q. It is easy to see that MmaX is sound for Q and I. Since 
M max > M, we see that the surveillance protection mechanism is not maximal. 
For the remaining part of this section we will investigate how to modify surveillance 
so as to make it more complete. (We will continue to assume that programs do not have 
observable running times.) As a step in this direction, suppose that we modify surveillance 
so that it can detect flowchart occurrences of the form: 
FALSE , TRVE 
-: 
For these if then eZse constructs, could we make all future computations independent of 
the test that determined whether the then or the eZse path was to be taken so that the 
resulting protection mechanism is still sound ? 
EXAMPLE 7. The answer is yes, in some case, and is demonstrated by the last use of 
the if then else construct in program Q: 
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Certainly, the structure above is functionally equivalent to 
where f(1) = 1 if x1 = I, and f(xr) = 2 otherwise. 
Let us transform Q into Q’: 
Now the surveillance protection mechanism for Q’ and I = aZZow(2) always gives the 
output 1; clearly it is maximal. 
This example is just an instance of a general way to generate many different protection 
mechanisms: Given a program Q, transform it to Q’ where Q and Q’ are functionally 
equivalent. Then apply the surveillance protection mechanism to Q’ to yield a sound 
protection mechanism for Q. The ;f then else transform above is but one of many. For 
instance, we could create a while transform that operates on 
in a way analogous to the if then else transform. It is 
Indeed, transforms can be created for all single-entry and single-exit structures. 
Such transformations will always result in a mechanism at least as complete as the 
initial mechanism if the test involves a disallowed input variable (or a program variable 
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that is derived from a disallowed input). Nothing will be gained if the test never involves 
a disallowed input variable. Is the application of such transformation always advisable? 
Unfortunately, the answer is no. 
EXAMPLE 8. Consider the program Q: 
Let I = aZZow(2) be the security policy again. Let M be the surveillance protection 
mechanism for Q and I, also let M’ be the protection mechanism that corresponds to 
using the if then else transform on Q. M’ is the surveillance protection mechanism for the 
following program: 
M’ always outputs A. On the other hand, M outputs 1 provided xa = 1; hence, M > M’. 
The danger is that since one does not know which branch is to be taken one must assume 
the worst case. 
Whether to apply a transform or not is not necessarily a clearcut decision. In fact the 
optimal strategy for deciding is not, as the next theorem shows, computable. 
THEOREM 4. There is no effective procedure that given a program Q and security policy 1 
outputs a maximal sound protection mechanism. 
Proof. Consider the following recursive program Q and security policy I = aZZow( ) 
(i.e., none of the potential inputs are allowed): 
: - - -_ I _____, 
I . : 
/ . 
I . j p  
i .-___ __--.i 
i= 
v+r 
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Here P is a flowchart fragment that assigns the value A(x,) to r where A(x,) is some 
arbitrary total function so that A(O) = 0. Let M be a maximal sound protection mecha- 
nism. Now M(O) = 0 or fl. We claim that 
M(O) = 0 if and only if Vx A(x) = 0 (“1 
Since policy I permits the output of Q to depend on no input variable, M must be a 
constant function. 
If Vx, A(x) = 0 then M is always equal to 0. Now assume A(b) # 0; we must show 
that M(0) # 0. Certainly M(b) = 0 or fl. If M(0) = 0, then M cannot be constant; 
hence (*) is true. 
Now (*) shows that if we can effectively construct M, then we can effectively determine 
whether or not VX, A(x) = 0; this is, however, impossible. 
Ruzzo [13] has made several interesting observations. It is undecidable whether M 
is sound for Q and 1, even if it is known that M is a protection mechanism for Q, since Q 
is sound for Q and alZow( ) if and only if Q is constant. Thus it may be arbitrarily difficult 
to prove the soundness of a given protection mechanism. 
He has also observed that the maximal sound mechanism need not be recursive (even 
when Q and I are). To see this, consider Q(xi , x2) and I = aZZow(1). The maximal 
mechanism M(x, , x2) will give (1 at just these values of xi (regardless of x2 , of course) 
where Q(xr , xs) is not a constant function of y. Letting Q(xr , XJ = if the ith Turing 
machine on input xi halts after exactly x2 steps then 1 else 0, we see that M(sc, , x2) = A 
if and only if the with Turing machine halts on xi . Certainly this is not a recursive 
function. 
5. MECHANISM IMPLEMENTATION 
We now turn to the implementation of protection mechanisms. We have already 
defined how to derive a surveillance protection mechanism given a flowchart program 
and a specific policy. Such a mechanism, when executed, enforces the security policy 
dynamically. 
As observed by Moore [8], static information flow analysis techniques can be used to 
determine the flow of information that will occur at the time a program is executed. 
Moore illustrates such a technique for Algol-like programs. Denning and Denning [3] 
have also illustrated the semantics of such a flow analysis mechanism. Such flow analysis 
is closely related to the flow analysis performed by compilers, for example, to generate 
optimal code by performing common subexpression evalution only once. Flow analysis 
must take into account not merely the flow of information through data variables (as 
compilers do now), but also flow through the program counter in order to avoid difficulties 
such as transmitting disallowed information via negative inference. 
Using static techniques to produce programs would result in efficient security enforce- 
ment. Of course, this requires that the security policy be known at compile time. In 
many cases, the policy is dependent upon the user requesting execution of the program. 
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A different compilation would be required for each different security policy to be enforced 
for a given program. 
We will not dwell on the subject of compile time enforcement except to suggest an 
additional technique which in some cases will result in a more complete protection 
mechanism. This technique is particularly suitable for the compile time environment; 
it is program transformation. 
EXAMPLE 9. Consider the following program Q and policy aZZow(1): 
If the if then else transform were applied the program would be rewritten as 
The related protection mechanism would always output a violation notice. 
In contrast, the program can be transformed to a functionally equivalent program by 
duplicating the assignment to y. 
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For the transformed program the protection mechanism need only give a violation notice 
in case X, # 0. Thus, the following is a protection mechanism for Q and allow(l): 
Transforming a program may be the basis for determining a more complete protection 
mechanism, but Theorem 4 states that it is hopeless to attempt to write an analysis 
program which has as its objective finding the maximal sound protection mechanism 
for any input programs and policy. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The security area currently lacks unity in its basic definitions and terminology. A 
contribution of this work is the isolation and precise statement of the key questions and 
concepts needed in any theory of security. It appears to us that the following questions 
are central to any such theory: 
1. What is to be enforced ? 
2. What is to do the enforcing? 
3. Does it do the enforcing ? 
4. If it does, then how well does it do the enforcing ? 
5. What assumptions, if any, are made in answer to question 3 ? 
These questions are expressed precisely in our theory as follows: 
1’. What is the security policy ? 
2’. What is the protection mechanism ? 
3’. Is the protection mechanism sound ? 
4’. How complete is the protection mechanism ? 
5’. Does the observability postulate hold ? 
Not only are these the key questions but our framework is general. It is not biased toward 
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any particular solution for providing security. Our model is useful for modeling pheno- 
mena ignored in other models-such as running time or page faults. For example, it can 
be used to model capability systems as well as surveillance. 
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